Introduction
Most political actors have recognized the Marshall Plan, officially named the European Recovery Program (ERP), as the most prolific foreign humanitarian aid program from the United States to Western Europe in history. As the United States Congress began to construct the proposal, it requested that the Brookings Institute conduct a comprehensive study and provide recommendations. On January 22, 1948, Brookings produced its findings for structure, focus, and operating procedures of the Marshall Plan, setting the course for the ERP. Brookings' recommendations confirmed the conditions in Europe and affirmed the necessity of relief. The report offered consideration for the construction of a new and separate American agency. Even more, Brookings offered recommendations that an American be appointed to manage the recovery program in each nation-state receiving aid. 1 As the United States Congress concentrated on identifying nation-states to participate in the recovery program, it was apprehensive on helping Germany, Japan, Italy, and its allies. From1936 through 1945, Germany, Japan, Italy, and its allies were primarily responsible for establishing an alliance known as the Axis Powers. The Axis Powers consisted of nation-states that had the ability to use their power on a global scale (i.e., Germany, Italy, Japan, Hungary, Romani, Bulgaria) versus Allies (United States, Britain, France, USSR, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Greece, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, and Yugoslavia). 2 3 4 The United Nations was hesitant to help the Axis alliance as a result of previous war activities. Figure 1 is a synopsis of the Axis Powers and war campaigns. 
Origins
In an arduous battle to recover from an imploding financial system, Europe's export/import market was at the brink of collapse. During this weakened state, the Soviet Union, an irrepressible communist nation-state declared its intent to seize Europe. The United States recognized that it had too much to gamble on the outcome of this hostile takeover. If the Soviet Union were to seize Europe, the United Nations' export and import market would implode as well. The susceptibility of misdirected revenue and impending surrender to the Soviet Union's communist regime compelled the United States to action. Subsequently, the United States Congress produced the most quintessential piece of legislation in history to impact global strategy and the modernization of Europe.
The United States Congress advanced the direction and construction of the greatest global strategy project in history. This global strategy aimed "to preserve America's vital tactical interests" in Europe. Congress introduced the strategy as a tactic to "mobilize public and political support" from both Republicans and Democrats, to take immediate action, and re-establish Europe's sovereignty, and sway bipartisan support. The conventional defense of Marshall Aid was presented as a stratagem to save Europe and to ensure the future of American Civilization.
As stratagems were evolving, on June 5, 1947 , at Harvard University, Senator Marshall spoke to graduates at their commencement ceremony. He proclaimed, "The people of this country are distant from the troubled areas of the Earth and it is hard for them to comprehend the plight and consequent reactions of the long-suffering peoples, and the effect of those reactions on their governments in connections with our efforts to promote peace in the world." The purpose of the plan was to rebuild Europe's war-torn nation-states, to diminish famine and pandemonium in the streets, to promote free trade, and to create democracy for its nation and their allies.
Following months of debate in France, through collaboration of the United States bipartite and European partisanship, the ERP, Public Law 472, was accepted with 395 votes for acceptance and 75 votes against it (Bossuat, 2008) . 6 Thus were born provisions for the European Recovery Program (ERP) and European Cooperation Administration in June 1947, directed by Paul G. Hoffman from Washington, D.C. , the groups established the ERP and ECA. After which, the United States implored the Soviet Union and its allies to participate in the Marshall Plan. The Soviet ambassador in Washington assumed that the ERP was a great initiative and persuaded Stalin to consider the plan. At the outset, Stalin too assumed the ERP would benefit all nations of Europe; it seemed a viable resolution for Europeans, until he discerned that credits would be extended only on willingness to accept economic cooperation and that Germany would also be extended aid, which he thought would hamper the Soviets' ability to exercise influence in Western Germany (Wettig, 2008) . Further, Stalin surmised that the Eastern Bloc nation-states might defy Soviet directives not to accept the aid, potentially causing a loss of control in the Eastern Bloc. In addition, the most important prerequisite was that every nation-state to join the plan would need to have its economic profile accessed, which the Soviets would not accept (p. 66).
The United States' built-in limited conditional terms on economic collaboration and disclosure of information guaranteed that Stalin and the Soviet Union would never accept the conditions stated in the proposal (Alvarez-Cuadrado, 2008) . Stalin struggled to negotiate with the United States. Still, the United States repudiated any notion to either modify or negotiate language (p. 138). Stalin inferred that the plan's stipulations were much too perilous to subscribe. Thereafter calling the United States fascist, pusillanimous, and authoritarian, and then declared its allies as enemies in the plan (p. 139). The Soviet Union refused to accept humanitarian aid (Robert, 2000) , thereby prescribing punishment onto "its people to years of depravation under socialist economic schemes and totalitarian régimes." This tumultuous history leads to the central question: Was there a missed opportunity for the United States to cultivate relations to reunify and neutralize all nation-states in Europe?
March notes of 1952
Preceding the "Battle of the Notes," Stalin drafted a note urging the allies of the United States and Europe (United Kingdom, France) to reconsider their objectives to including Germany in NATO. In lieu of the American proposal, in a second note, Stalin protested nation states' alliance with Germany. He urged occupying powers to administer elections and proceedings instead of the United States, and broader delineation be conscripted by the Potsdam Conference. Moreover, prior to the adoption of the European Defense Community (EDC) treaty, Stalin sent a third note, citing the Germany Treaty, condemning the purpose of the EDC and its intent to "delay negotiations for a peace treaty." In addition, he insisted that Eastern Bloc diplomats surrender to occupy powers at the treaty negotiations. In the last note sent, Stalin emphasized the Soviet Union's stance to nullify election proceedings, and treaties that included German powers (Steininger, 1990; Walko, 2002) .
These circumstances led to the "Battle of the Notes" between all U.S. aligned nation-states, the Soviet Union, and its allies. Because of language adopted in the EDC, which repudiates the Soviet's proposal to prevent Eastern Germany from joining NATO, in succession Germany in the Great Patriotic War demolished the Soviet Union (Smyser, 1999) . The central question remains: was there a missed opportunity for the United States and its allies to cultivate relations to reunify and neutralize all nation-states in Europe?
Missed opportunity or not?
The question surrounding whether the United States could have cultivated relations with Stalin and the Soviet Union to reunify and neutralize all nation-states under a NATO agreement is truly debatable for several reasons. (1) Logically, it is impossible to discern the intentions of the Soviet Union; the world will never know whether the Soviet Union would have permitted a neutral, democratic, or unified pact with Germany. (2) For certain, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) produced greater benefits than conceding to Germany as a sovereign state. For example, several of the occupying powers of the Second World War reveled in the prestige of such maneuvers as controlling the Eastern German borders, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. The GDR governance was a vassal of East Germany. Moreover, the Soviet Union easily exploited economic resources from allies and military, with the exclusion of the Austrian government. With its unyielding economic growth and lack of military strategies, the Soviet Union virtually controlled Austria. Finally, scholars have tried to discern whether Germany would have worked collaboratively with the Soviet Union. There is a greater probability that (3) the Soviet Union could have subjugated Germany through reunification efforts; and (4) Stalin could have hostilely seized Western Europe and its allies; however, without integration with all U.S. aligned nation-states, subsequently, West Germany might have been far worse economically (Smyser, 1999 
Appropriations between 1948 and 1952
In France, at the Hotêl Talleyrand, the ERP Conference ensued excluding the presence of the Soviet Union and its allies. Supportive of the European Recovery Plan, sixteen Western European nation-states and allies along with the United States gathered to construct a plan to rebuild and synthesize atrophied nation-states. After much debate, an agreement was reached and the Europeans sent a reconstruction plan to Washington. At the outset, the Europeans requested $22 billion in aid. President Truman countered the proposal with $17 billion for Congressional approval. Stemming from much opposition, the finance appropriations committee initially passed $5 billion, in succession, with influential bipartisan support to send $12.5 billion over a span of four years, passed (Grogin, 2001 (Hogan, 1987) . By the end of 1952, the Mutual Security Act (MSA) replaced the ECA. After 1953, there is no more mention of the ERP. 8 One after the other, bilateral, multilateral, and unilateral aid organizations emerged. Figure 2A shows bilateral development assistance programs. 9 Bilateral aid programs fostered viable economic progress and social stability in developing nation-states. Figure 2B shows multilateral aid programs. Multilateral aid programs were combination resources, the majority of the programs financed with private donations instead of direct government contributions. Unilateral aid funds are direct contributions from one nation to other nation-states experiencing natural disasters. Table 1 shows the top beneficiary scale of aid between 1948 and 1952. In 2007, following a stream of inquiries on how foreign aid disbursements are made, the CRS revealed a number of U.S. government agencies (aforementioned) attested to expending foreign aid to nation-states with parallel objectives. State financial aid officers, conceded that agencies either worked by "cross-purposes" or with intent to duplicate constructs reported as different aid objectives. Equally astonishing, in the twenty-first century, there were no "overarching mechanisms" in place to access the range of output. Consequently, State officers eventually used compendious systems in place among various departments and agencies, such as the U.S. National Security Council policy coordination committee, to generate new information-sharing technology, and inter-agency staff exchanges systems (CRS, 2009). Unfortunately, there remains no innovative processes in place that best improve systems of operations among State departments. Figure 3 shows overlapping agency foreign assistance activities. 
Aid implementation between 1948 and 1949
The United States appropriated aid to Western Europe nation-states annually in the form of grants, food, supplies, and cash transfers. By the end of World War II, the main commodities purchased from ECA were food and fuel. As a condition in the Western Hemisphere, the Economic Cooperation Agency (ECA) only arranged transference of aid and purchases. What the ECA administrators spent in three years, translated into a contemporary dollar equivalence of $1 billion, an enticement to unlawful activity and speculation (Machado, 2008) .
The United States' suppliers were paid in local currency and, sequential dollar amounts were credited against each respective ERP account. These processes generated income called 12 CRS: The size of circles is not proportional to each agency's share of foreign assistance disbursements, which changes significantly from year to year. An attempt was made to roughly show the average relative size of agencies' foreign aid activities over the last decade. Areas of overlapping agency jurisdiction in the chart can mean two things. They can indicate a joint effort in a particular sector, and/or unrelated agency activities within the same sector. An example of the former is food aid, which is funded through the Department of Agriculture but implemented by USAID. The HIV/AIDS overlap is an example of the latter, with multiple agencies disbursing PEPFAR funds through their own programs. Sometimes both types of overlap occur simultaneously, as with MCC and USAID. MCC implements compact agreements independent of USAID, but compacts generally fund long-term development projects similar to those carried out by USAID, and the MCC threshold program is implemented by USAID. Moreover, aid appropriation was in the context of a USD GDP of $258 billion in 1948, in excess of $12 billion in U.S. aid to Europe and counted separately from the Marshall Plan (Milward, 1984) . Successive plans, such as the Mutual Security Plan replaced the Marshall Plan mid-1951 (Nicholaus, 2008 . The threat of the Korean War compromised security for nation-states, in accordance creating a greater urgency for aid. Inasmuch "Western Europe received $13 billion to rebuild its military infrastructure." $3.4 billion went towards the import of raw materials and semi-manufactured products; $3.2 billion allocated for food, feed, and fertilizer; $1.9 billion for machines, vehicles, and equipment; and $1.6 billion for fuel (Hogan, 1987) .
One after the other, multilateral organizations entered the arena (i.e., the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation (UNRRA), Interim Aid; Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA), The Export-Import Bank, and the World Bank (p. 33)) to assist in the Korean War. Figure 4 shows the projected and actual increase in output of selected commodities between 1948 and 1949. Somewhere between FY1946 and FY1953, tabulation for counterpart funds for commodity purchases developed erratically. Noticeably, ambiguous time and information varies from researchers pertaining to constructs surrounding the Marshall Plan. The United States had the latitude to question the amount of commodities: food, and fertilizer, energy, cotton, unprocessed goods, tobacco, machines, and vehicles. Table 2 shows the distribution of aid by commodities purchased from ERP funds delivered to Europe FY1948 and FY1951. The central question: for how many more missed opportunities can the United States the take credit?
Missed opportunity or not?
In spite of the Marshall Plan, "rhetoric of aid" to nation-states between 1948 and 1951 there is no methodical evidence to corroborate findings of increased productivity, economic growth, or the proliferation of trade (De Long & Eichengreen, 1993) . The point is, because of the lack of time and inadequate statistics, the implementation of aid appropriation is unnoticeable. In opposition, US $1.7 billion program of grants and loans to European nationstates to purchase U.S. products was an essential factor during West European postwar recovery (Tammen, 1990) . The largest portion of Marshall Plan money covered imports of agricultural products, raw materials and semi-finished products (Kostrzewa, 1990) .
As aforementioned in section 3, aid implementation was at the discretion of Economic Council of Advisors (ECA) with nation-states; whereby, acquisitions and grants for support credits were deposited on counterpart coffers and accounts, subsequently used for debt reduction or domestic investments on behalf of nation-states. Consequently, these reserves enhanced nation-states capacity to direct profits into local political campaigns, hence reinforcing state control over Western Europe's economies, 13 while at the same time grossly undermining the effect of aid implementation. Simultaneously, the ECA Marshall Plan intensified internal policies of pacification. Further, it became the impelling cause of economic centralism in Germany, Italy, France, Austria, and Greece (Cowen, 1985, p. 66) which affected a propensity for corruption in Greece (p. 69). Figure 2 illustrates aid-subjugated processes for commodities based on "projected -toactual" objectives. Originating from the project-to-actual total distributions as coarse grains, sugar beets, and tin (ores), relief volumes shown exceed the anticipated volumes, still the valuations do not support constructs for economic stability. By the mid-1950s, relief aimed to upturn European economic growth was destabilized. President Dwight Eisenhower's administration marginalized humanitarian aid, concentrating on security assistance to strategic allies changing the landscape of foreign aid. 17 The Economic Council of Advisors (ECA) instructed Marshall Plan recipients to contribute aid appropriations to a rearmament defense account and further requested a considerable alteration of their own economic resources from civilian to military production to gain reapportion (Wexler, 1983, p. 69) . Finally, the problems attributable to the United States Marshall Plan throughout the implementation process are a result of unmanaged policies and limited capital. Consequently, the idea of the Marshall Plan was to transfer wealth from a technologically advanced nation to unindustrialized nation-states (Bandow, 1994) . Table 4 shows the discretionary budget appropriation and trends in Foreign Aid Funding Trends between FY1946 and FY1953; FY 1954 and FY1963; FY 1964 and FY1973; FY1974 and FY1985; FY 1986 and FY1996; FY 1997 and FY2006; FY 2007 
The absence of financial independence is not the cause of poverty, it is poverty; therefore, to have financial independence is synonymous with achieving economic wealth, not its precondition (Bauer, 1987) . Nevertheless, scholars question whether there were missed opportunities by ECA to ensure investment egalitarianism. Anecdotally, post-World War II investment opportunities were scarce; consequently, the Marshall Plan might be credited for stimulating economic prosperity in Europe. Despite the efforts of the plan, proceeding Europe was destitute with infrequent resources. The level of sustainability lessened, making necessary repair to the railroads, buildings, and equipment utterly impossible. Further, they wanted fiscal reform in France and Italy, moderated by ECA austerity, predicated on the volume of counterpart investments that generated revenue for recipients' nation-states. Conversely, ECA's officials criticized counterpart apportionments to national and public companies (Bossuat, 2008) . Nevertheless, propaganda forced ECA's position; within two year's monetary resources were relinquished to French, German, and Italian governments to gather important funds for the primary economic sectors (p. 20). Consequently, these conditions changed Marshall Funds to appropriation according to the Monnet Plan: a sociopolitical plan officially named, the theory of l'engrenage provisionally legalized the facilitation of, and redirection of coal-production from Germany's existing coalmines in Ruhr and the Saar area to France. 19 In summary, ECA ensured investment egalitarianism. Evolution brought with it innovation. Following the implementation of a sociopolitical plan, propaganda further changed bilateral relations between the United States, France, and Germany and its allies. Because of evolution, ECA earmarked $6 billion grant to fund a revolutionary mechanism (e.g., IntraEuropean trade), as a means to remove traditional barriers to multilateral trade, constructing all European currencies convertible. Fund allocations aid France, Italy, the U. K., and Belgium's modernization efforts; inevitably, waiving some American rights and weakening its trade proposition. Further, ECA authorized $4 billion of the grant appropriations to European Payments Union (EPU) to balance payments to nation-states marking the era of a stabilized Europe (Machado, 2008, p. 45) .
Strength
Arguably, the Marshall Plan has had various effects on nation-states; some European officials believe that, "it sped their recovery" in concurrence with its "initial recovery program." Similarly, Americans suggest that the Marshall Plan eradicated famine, poverty, dogmatic anarchy, subverted communist terrorizations, and stabilized European nationstates (Eichengreen, 2008) . Literature reviews indicate that the acceptance of "Communist activities gradually decreased" in the years following the Marshall Plan (DeConde & Burns, 2002) . The Plan circumvented export-import trade barriers and created inroads that shaped the "North Atlantic Alliance that would persist throughout the Cold War." Further helping
Europeans reclaim confidence in social equipoise (Machado, 2008) and simultaneously reposing the minds of formidable critics. The Marshall Planners were mythical; they collaborated with European governments of the center and far right in Greece, of the centerright in Italy and West Germany, and the left in Norway and the United Kingdom, concurrently cultivating propitious relations with the Royalists, Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Laborites (p. 55).
The George Marshall Plan is ascribed to nationalized modernization in France, as defined in the Monnet Plan, whereby, 90% of funds went to revive the substructures of France, Germany, Britain, and Italy and to stimulate economic growth (Wall, 1993; Behrman, 2007) . In addition, the United States contributed in excess of $12.5 billion in aid, and more than $500 billion as an equivalent to America's gross national product (GNP) and $100 billion in grants. The United States worked purposelessly to evade actions contrary to their foremost interests (Marjolin, 1989, p. 180 Varaschin (2002) . Nonetheless, modernization and the most recent American technology produced a model of international relations that produced an exchange of technology instead of one-way imports (Varaschin) In the wake of the Marshall Plan (ERP), the U.S. has maintained the same philosophy on foreign humanitarian aid: to prevent obdurate nation-states from tumultuous political, economic, and social conditions. In the twenty-first century, however, foreign humanitarian aid has become synonymous with national security, commercial interests, cataclysms, and social conflict. The scope of U.S. foreign humanitarian aid prohibits economic poverty, governance deficiency, incivility, and narcotic manufacturing and trafficking (Tarnoff & Lawson 2009 ). The question remains: has the Marshall Plan become a metaphor for earmarks, and eccentric government spending in the name of foreign humanitarian aid to persevere American society? To a point, foreign humanitarian aid has become a metaphor for earmarks. Earmarking is the redistribution of revenue used to invest in an explicit domestic or foreign commercial enterprise. Annually, by approval of the Department of State International Affairs, USAID, and other foreign affairs agencies earmark provisions (e.g., social infrastructure and economic substructure) are built-in financial plans as investment allowances from both bilateral and multilateral coffers. Table 5 shows foreign humanitarian aid appropriations to the top nation state recipients between FY2001 and FY2010. The summary of U.S. foreign humanitarian aid further illustrates conditions for endowment appropriations to nation-states. Endowments are appropriated to nation-states in the form of cash transfers, equipment, commodities, infrastructure, or technical assistance, and in recent decades, are provided almost exclusively in the form of grants rather than loans (Tarnoff & Lawson 2011) . Table 6 shows the top recipients of U.S. foreign humanitarian aid FY 2010. The Marshall Plan European Recovery Program's aim to modernize the European economy and to revitalize free enterprise post-war, found itself in stark contrast, to its intent. By 1952, as funding gradually depleted given the inconclusive economics of recipient nation-states, economists could not differentiate through direct nor indirect appropriation how prosperous Europe might have become without it (Eichengreen, 2008) . Particularly in lieu of "the shift to remilitarization after the Korean War," results were even less conclusive (Marchado, 2008) . The Marshall Plan was not an isolated strategy of assistance, but rather an exclusive act beginning a sequence of postwar aid that included United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation.
This chapter session presents a critical assessment of the concept of foreign humanitarian assistance programs as defined in "the Marshall Plan," and administrated during the postWar to address the following questions:
wherefore social resilience is enough to obliterate nation-states' dependency on humanitarian assistance programs? 
Key International Aid and Humanitarian Aid Accounts for 2011 (US $ in millions)

The marshall plan criticism
The United States has pontificated on the inevitability of bombastic aid to rebuild nationstates without the presupposition of hopelessness. Virtually sixty-five years later the sequence of deficiency is uninterrupted. According to German political analyst, Werner Abelshauser, the United States was the primary economic imperialist orchestrating humanitarian aid distributions to control Europe. He contends foreign aid was neither Europe's indicator of recovery or sustainability.
For example, the economic recoveries in France, Italy, and Belgium existed before the stream of U.S. aid (Cowen, 1985) . Belgium, a nation that depended the most on unrestricted exchanges of economic policies after its liberation in 1944, experienced the fastest recovery, eluded a collapse in its housing market and food scarcities seen in other European nations. 25 Alan Greenspan explicated in his memoir, The Age of Turbulence, that Ludwig Erhard's trade and industry strategies accelerated Western European growth. Erhard's modification to trade and industry modus operandi legitimized Germany's recovery, and those strategies jumped-started Western Europe and its allies to rebuild institutions and a nation. 26 Conversely, there is an inherent bias of government-to-government aid towards state control and politicization (Bauer, 1981) . This session argues the legitimacy of nation-states' foreign humanitarian aid and aid distribution.
The United States' foreign humanitarian aid has become the "opiate" for nation-states. Independent of how inattentive, unscrupulous, or autocratic a nation-state may be, there is always some administration or global agency motivated to supply aid (i.e., bilateral, multilateral, and unilateral benefactors) with a few more million dollars. By subsidizing political and pernicious policies, foreign aid ill serves the worlds' impoverished. 27 For instance, in Indonesia, the government-usurped sharecroppers 'produced for aid-financed irrigation canals. In Mali, sharecroppers were coerced to auction their harvests at bargain prices to joint aid projects and to further Mali government initiatives. In Egypt, Haiti, and elsewhere, the values for sharecroppers harvest plummeted as the United States intervened with aid (p. 2).
Alesina and Weder (1999) said global programs to alleviate poverty (e.g., bilateral aid from richer to poorer nation-states, multilateral aid from international organizations, grants at below market rates, technical assistance, and debt forgiveness) in fact increase the chance of parliamentary exploitation. 28 The Marshall Plan initially perpetuated unscrupulous propagandized schemes. 29 In retort, critics of these programs argue instead that, contrary to the more or less sincere intentions of the donors, corrupt governments received just as much aid as less corrupt ones (p. 3). These issues are perpetual; often-financial assistance does not reach the needy in the developing nations, but instead is wasted on inefficient public consumption. 30 For instance, appropriations given to France and the Netherlands totaled resources used to finance their military forces in Southeast Asia inaugurating the context for the largest sums of private U. S. investments in Europe, creating the groundwork for modern transnational corporations (Chomsky & Ruggiero, 2002, p. 9 (Mclean, 2004, p. 363) . The effect of globalization relative to colonization is not discussed in this chapter.
Accordingly, Kahin (2003) wrote that the Netherlands used a significant portion of the aid it received to re-conquer Indonesia during the Indonesian National Revolution, and then forced them to join the Korean War in 1950 after pressuring them to surrender or lose aid if they did not comply. 32 These examples emphasize an unequivocal contradiction of egalitarianism.
The myriad of foreign aid was created on the premise that foreign government is dedicated to its naturalized citizens' welfare. The premise has proven to be a meager supposition of social imperialism. Suppositions of social imperialism are the remnants of rancorous philosophies on the part of nation-states and foreign aid systems of government that describe the impalpable interest of naturalized citizen. 33 For example, aid projects in Guatemala failed partly because some Guatemalan government officials opposed improving the plight of the rural impoverished. 34 A million people starved in the Sudan in 1985 because the government-owned railroad refused to transport American-donated food. 35 In Africa, where tribal rivalries often still prevail, aid money was used to prop up the reigning factions in the same way that local American political machines use federal grants as slush funds; an increase in the accolades of political conflict in contemporary Africa and less urbanized environments, as described by Bauer (1984) . Therefore, there is an outlining presumption that the United States has consciously continued to finance an exorbitant quantity of coffers to entice foreign government to not commit economic suicide. 36 Generally, foreign investments were interchangeable when outside entities (i.e., multilateral organizations) made cash accessible to recipient governments, consecutively releasing their revenue for other purposes. For instance, Ghana, Brazil, Kenya, and the Ivory Coast spent billions building new capital cities. In addition to alluring industrialized corporations to their nation-states, for example, Mercedes-Benz automobiles were very popular among African government officials; whereby the etymology of Swahili has been changed labeling officials as wabenzi (men of the Mercedes-Benz As cited previously, the Marshall Plan had been a multilateral approach to problem solving. It was conceived as institution building and nation building, but within the constructs of regional economic integration, appropriations increased from 17 to 149 nation-states, with an expectation of self-governance to eliminate xenophobia. Perhaps this plan was too optimistic rather than pragmatic on the part of the United States. Conversely, in the implementation stage of the Marshall Plan, economists have since observed that not all 16 Arab states in the Middle East were included in planned initiatives. The absence of a single democratic government among them poses a threat to the United States; as a result, the rhetorical question of international reverence and legitimacy has been posed. 40
Threats
Arguably, it is difficult to oppose fundamental aid to relieve societies who are currently underprivileged under an authoritarian regime, or struggling to gain the sense of tolerance and prosperity that Americans value. In theory, military means will not suffice when it comes to ending the terrorism that threatens the United States and its allies, or halting the insurgencies that destabilize the Middle East (Etzioni, n.d.) . 
Recommendation
The United States legislative bodies continue to be divided over the legitimacy of foreign humanitarian aid programs and the proportions of the federal investments used to fund them. The divide is between those who want to eliminate foreign aid versus those who want to increase reserve delineation, to improve program proficiency, and to lessen taxpayers' liability. This session of the chapter describes methods to achieve objectives. This process has the proclivity to procure billions in taxable revenue, if desired, to eliminate unnecessary regulations that foster inefficient expenditures. 49 
Recommendation 2
 Keep the budget used to procure U.S food at its current levels for a net increase in direct distribution to assist those in emergencies.  Appropriate $280 million in different coffers to the International Affairs 150 account for development assistance.  Allocate coffers to private volunteer organizations (PVOs) to support food security programs and complementary development activities. 50 51 Monetization of the United States' in-kind food aid is the sale of food commodities purchased, shipped from the United States, and sold into foreign markets. These processes include assistance from U.S. based non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In accordance, these practices generate revenues on local currencies introduced in the Food Security Act of 1985 as a method to support PVOs in order to recuperate administration, transportation, distribution, and storage costs linked to food aid dissemination. 52 Monetization is a type of food aid, in accordance to World Vision and international NGO, defined as "all foodsupported processes aimed at improving the food security of people living in poverty over a time, whether funded by means of international, national, public, or private resources." 53 Conversely, the process of monetizing can be useful for promoting low-cost, viable food markets by boosting investment in transportation, infrastructure, and human capital (traders, entrepreneurs). Essentially, food aid monetization can improve long-term food security by reassuring competitive food marketing systems that have built-in incentives to provide the poor with affordable food. 54 Today the United States reinforced its commitment to food aid and monetization for nonemergency development through the 2008 Farm Bill. As a result, the Farm Bill provides concurrent earmarks for nonemergency Title II programs: $375 million in FY2009, $400 million in FY2010, $425 million in FY2011, $450 million FY2012 (Section 3021). 55 Theoretically, expansive subsidy systems foster American sovereignty. In reality, the United States could not be more in control, or secured following the threat of 9/11. Globally, the United States yields the most expensive food of any other multilateral organization without question: It has the capability to eliminate agricultural subsidies. The United States could lessen the impact of subsidies maneuvering for a better position and expurgate appropriations without jeopardizing its market position if it chooses to do so. The adverse effect of Congress' inability to relinquish control impedes aid agencies ability to seize different opportunities to modernize programs or ripostes to global emergencies. Therefore, it stand to reason that neither Europe, nor its allies are incapable of jettisoning humanitarian assistance programs. The central question: is there a need to modernize the Marshall Plan?
Conclusion
No one can rebut the gist of economic growth, institutional reconstruction, cultivation of external and internal affiliations, or ethicality, of indoctrinating indigenous military and police forces to keep us safe; they are indispensable. Yet, is there a need to modernize the Marshall Plan? Let take a brief look at the Marshall Plan and its impact:
